August 11, 2024

Summary

In their fight against Tuareg rebels, Malian troops are supported by Russia’s Wagner Group.

More by Stephen Harley

Ukraine v Russia – in Africa?

Ukraine v Russia – in Africa?

Growing Russian influence in Mali (Photo courtesy of Chatham House)

The two year conflict spills into Mali, Sudan and elsewhere…

In the last week Russian forces have flooded into the Donetsk area of Ukraine, pushing the front line back into Ukraine: but then, in turn, Ukrainian armoured and airborne forces flooded into the Kursk region of Russia itself. To watch the developing situation on dynamic infographics is like watching someone squeeze red and blue balloons against each other in alternation. One takes the space of the other, then the other takes the space left by the first.

The Empire Flounders Back

The land assault into Russia is novel, a result of Ukraine’s supporters such as the US, the UK and Germany recently allowing the use of the weapons and vehicles they have supplied to be used outside the borders of Ukraine. It was previously feared this might provoke an escalation by neo-Imperial Russia, possibly even the use of tactical nuclear weapons. That fear seems to have dissipated as European elections have delivered a series of centre-left inclined governments and pro-Putin former President Donald Trump flounders ahead of the November elections in the United States.

But the red and blue balloons, when squeezed, are also bulging in a different direction: Africa.

Plausible Deniability

In their fight against Tuareg rebels, Malian troops are supported by Russia’s Wagner Group. Groups such as Wagner seem to operate a revolving door with the formal Russian armed forces: but at other times they fill their ranks with foreigners and long-term convicts on a ‘survive and be freed’ contract. (Those interested in joining are strongly advised to read the small print in the contract.)

Wagner is one of a number of mercenary groups operated by Moscow, close enough to the onion domes of the Kremlin to secure influence in mineral rich, vulnerable countries like Syria, but distant enough to add a layer of deniability when things go wrong.

Two weeks ago an operation against the Tuaregs near the Mali-Algeria border went very wrong. Wagner itself admitted to being ambushed and Mali said it lost two fighters: a sandstorm had aided the rebels, they said.

What goes on social media stays on social media – forever

However, the Tuaregs themselves posted numerous photographs of dozens of corpses, mixed black and white, and burning Russian-made armoured vehicles. (No sandstorm in sight.) Geo-location verifies that the images are from the area of the ambush.

Then a leading commentator on Grey Space, a pro-Russian, pro-Wagner social media page, went silent not long after posting photographs of proud, cocky looking Russian fighters in the Malian desert. A commander of one of the Wagner units in Mali, the 13th Storm Brigade, was confirmed killed in an obituary. A Wagner wives and girlfriends social media group on Telegram noted that they were ‘praying’ for 75 husbands and boyfriends.

The Bamako authorities and Wagner have since alternated between trying to cover up what was obviously a military catastrophe and attributing the obvious reality of the situation to ‘foreign support’.

In the latter, they might be right. Ukraine’s ambassador to Mali (who resides in Senegal, covering various Sahel nations) initially claimed that Ukrainian special forces had supported the planning of the ambush. He was quickly expelled as ambassador by the governments of Mali and then Niger, run by another Russian-supported military junta. (The expulsion probably didn’t require a massive effort by DHL, maybe the unscrewing of a couple of metal plaques from the walls of supportive other nation’s embassy front walls.)

Slightly more serious was the summoning of the Ukrainian ambassador to Senegal, fresh from his expulsion, by the Dakar authorities, to express their concern about his comments. But by all accounts it was the most jovial of reprimands and reflective of the fact that he can go home to Kyiv but Senegal will always be a neighbour of Mali and Niger. He withdrew his claim.

Achille’s Heel

It is not entirely implausible that Ukrainian forces did support the Tuareg rebels. The Ukrainians are highly skilled after years of training by western forces: and they now have significant operational experience. Perhaps a few months ‘training’ in a sunny climate is something of a rest, but one that doesn’t allow skills to fade too much.

There are similar allegations of Ukrainian special forces operating in Sudan in support of the Sudanese National Army faction against the Rapid Support Forces, who are also supported by Wagner. It is not beyond possibility that their western mentors have come with them – can you tell a Ukrainian from, say, an American or a German until they speak?

While it may seem counterintuitive for a country that has been invaded to send critical forces abroad in the midst of what is essentially a war of existential threat, there is a logic to what Ukraine might (emphasis: might) be doing. Wagner and its numerous lesser known cousins (Redut, Patriot, etc) is now a rotation for Russian forces out of the attritional hell of the Ukraine war. Russia is estimated to have suffered 500,000-750,000 casualties according to The Economist, and 139,000 killed according to the BBC. Some time in the sun and a bit of extra money ‘training local forces’ is probably quite welcome after months of trench warfare.

Except when the other side prove to capable adversaries.

Hit them where it hurts – in the Kremlin coffers

But Wagner and the others provide something more than a holiday for tired soldiers: all the countries where they operate – Mali, Niger, Sudan, Somalia and, briefly, Mozambique – are providing access to mineral resources and hard cash for the Kremlin, in return for services in support of various African governments. It is little wonder that Russia is trying so hard to encourage other African nations to take an unaligned position if the country is secure and stable like Kenya or to come into the anti-western fold where they are not.

So, in fact, a Ukrainian attack on these far-afield but vital operations has a strong logic: because sometimes it doesn’t matter where you stick a pin into a balloon. It will pop.

TAGS

Related Articles